Coronavirus is Likely to Affect Business Valuations in Business Divorce Litigation

As I’ve stated in previous blog postings, business divorce or oppression cases usually end with one side buying the other out. Hence, valuation of the subject company is often one of the central issues in the case. Clearly, the coronavirus has negatively impacted a lot of closely held companies. Coronavirus has and will likely affect the valuation of the small businesses that are often ripe for disputes between the shareholders, partners, or members.

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Business Divorce Cases Often Involve Complex Non-Corporate Issues

Business break-up cases require a complex, interdisciplinary approach to solving problems associated with the fractured relationships between the owners of a closely held company. A business divorce attorney must have an in-depth knowledge of corporate, employment, contract, and business tort law. It is important when selecting an attorney to represent you or your company in a shareholder or member oppression case that you select someone who knows more than simply corporate divorce law.

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Disrespectful & Unfairly Dispropriate Treatment of a Female Shareholder by Male Majority Shareholders in Closely Held Corporation Constituted Oppression

An Erie County, New York Supreme Court Justice recently held that the disrespectful and unfair dispropriate treatment of a female shareholder based upon her gender in a closely held corporation constituted oppression. In re Matter of Diane M. Straka, Index No. 807308-2017 (citing, Bus. Law. §1104(a)-(1).

In that case, the Plaintiff, Ms. Straka (a 25% shareholder in a closely held New York corporation) was able to prove at trial that she was subjected to disrespectful treatment based upon her gender. The other three shareholders were men. The Court found among other things, that:

  • When she first met one of the other shareholders, he asked Ms. Straka “…are you the one who makes the coffee;”
  • One of the shareholder’s posted a cartoon on his door that was deeming to women;
  • The Plaintiff stopped eating in the lunchroom because she was subjected to offensive comments; and,
  • One of the male shareholder asked if he could sit in her lap.

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Business Judgement Rule Inapplicable if Director is Engaged in Self-Dealing, Unconscionable, or Fraudulent Activities/Decisions

Pursuant to New Jersey corporate law, directors are trustees for the entire body of the owners. Directors owe loyalties to all shareholders. If they disregard the rights of the majority shareholders, minority shareholders, or the corporation itself they could be liable for a breach of fiduciary obligations or duties.

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Can the Termination of a Shareholder’s Employment be Oppression?

The termination of a shareholder’s employment may constitute oppression under N.J.S.A. 14A:12-7(b)(1)(c). That is because a person who holds a share in a closely held corporation often does so “for the assurance of employment in a closely-held corporation in the business.” Muellenberg v. Bilkon Corp., 143 N.J. 168, 180-181 (1996). That is because, a shareholder may have a “reasonable expectation” of continued employment. See, Brenner v. Berkowitz, 134 N.J. 488, 508 (1993).

When representing the minority, it is important to develop why the employee/shareholder had a reasonable expectation of continued employment. Of course, when representing the corporation or majority, counsel should present evidence that the employee/shareholder did not have a reasonable expectation of continued employment.

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Pennsylvania Appellate Court Affirms Dissolution of Profitable Limited Liability Companies Based Finding of Deadlock

In Staiger v. Holohan, 100 A.3d 622 (Pa. Super. 2014), a Pennsylvania appellate court found that a trial court could order the dissolution of a profitable Pennsylvania Limited Liability Company (“LLC”).

The facts of the case are simple and fairly straightforward. Plaintiff Michael Staiger (“Staiger”) and Defendant Kevin Holohan (“Holohan”) formed two Pennsylvania LLCs: 200 East Airy, LLC (“200 East Airy”) and Green and Airy Laundromat, LLC (“Laundromat”). Stainger lent 200 East Airy $165,000, to be used as start-up capital. The members agreed in writing that Stainger would be repaid the start-up money within five years. Both men owned 50% of both 200 East Airy and Laundromat. Both 200 East Airy’s and Laundromat’s operating agreements contained identical language which set forth that the members (Holohan & Stainger) have the authority to make business decisions and the decisions of a majority are controlling. Shortly after forming Laundromat, the members executed an agreement which provided that another unnamed LLC of Holman’s was to manage Laundromat for a fee for an initial term of five years, then continue for two additional five-year periods.

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New Jersey Appellate Division Decision Establishes Factors for Expelling Members of New Jersey Limited Liability Company

On March 17, 2015, the Appellate Division issued an important decision which provides guidance to New Jersey Trial Courts asked to judicially expel a member of a Limited Liability Company. IE Test, LLC v. Kenneth Carroll (App. Div. 2015)

N.J.S.A. 42:2B-24(b)(3) permits the expulsion of a member of a New Jersey Limited Liability Company under certain circumstances. The Appellate Division in IE Test, LLC v. Kenneth Carroll, provides a wonderful analysis of expulsion of a member based upon wrongful conduct (N.J.S.A. 42:2B-24(b)(3)(a)) or that the continued membership was not practicable to continue the business (N.J.S.A. 42:2B-24(b)(3)(c)).

The material facts of the case were undisputed and straightforward. Defendant Carroll and Mr. Cuppo were co-owners of a predecessor limited liability company, Instrumental Engineering, LLC (“IE”). Unfortunately, in or about 2009, IE was experiencing serious economic problems. As a result of those problems, Carroll and Cuppo decided that IE should file a Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy.

According to Carroll, he purchased some of IE’s assets from the bankruptcy trustee and transferred them to Plaintiff, IE Test, LLC for $5,000, which remained due and owing to him. Cuppo refuted the same. Unfortunately, there was no documentation supporting Carroll’s contention.

IE Test, LLC had three members, Carroll (33%); Cuppo (34%) and James (33%). In addition to the disagreement relating to the $5,000, sale of assets from IE, the three members could not reach agreement as to the terms and conditions of an Operating Agreement. In addition, several of the members testified during the course of their depositions that they could not work together and did not speak with one another.

The Trial Court Judge found that IE Test, LLC could not establish that Carroll engaged in wrongful conduct that adversely and materially harmed the company. Nevertheless, the Trial Court found that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 42:2B-24(b)(3)(c), it was not reasonably practicable to continue the business with Carroll as a member. Carroll appealed the Trial Court’s decision. In its decision, the Appellate Division provided a wonderful analysis of judicial considerations when determining whether or not to expel a member.

The Appellate Court first provided guidance on the standard for judicial expulsion of a member of a New Jersey Limited Liability based upon “wrongful” conduct. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 42:2B-24(b)(3)(a), a Court may only expel a member if it finds that the member’s conduct was “wrongful” and “actually harmed” the limited liability company in an “adverse and material manner.”

Next, the Appellate Court discussed the standard to expel a member because the continued inclusion of that member may not be practicable to carry on the business. The Court held that N.J.S.A. 42:2B-24(3)(c), does not require proof that the member committed any wrongful conduct whatsoever. Rather, subsection (c) is forward looking, only requiring proof that the member’s conduct makes it “not reasonably practicable to carry on the business if the member remained.”

The Appellate Division articulated the following seven factors when deciding whether or not to expel a member based upon the not reasonably practicable on the business statute:

  1. Whether the management of the entity is unable or unwilling reasonably to permit or promote the purposes for which the company was formed;
  2. Whether a member or manager has engaged in misconduct;
  3. Whether the members have clearly reached an inability to work with one another to pursue the company’s goals;
  4. Whether there is deadlock between the members;
  5. Whether the operating agreement provides a means of navigating around any such deadlock;
  6. Whether, due to the company’s financial position, there is still a business to operate; and
  7. Whether continuing the company is financially feasible.

The Appellate Division, applying those factors, affirmed the Trial Court’s decision expelling Carroll pursuant to N.J.S.A. 42:2B:24(b)(3)(c).

Pennsylvania Appellate Court Upholds Appointment of Custodial Receiver after Finding a Shareholder Was Oppressed

In Adler v. Tauberg, 881 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 2005), a Pennsylvania Appellate Court upheld an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County appointing Lawrence N. Adler, M.D., (“Adler”), a fifty percent shareholder, director and president of a closely-held Pennsylvania corporation, as custodian to manage the business affairs of the corporation after finding that the defendants oppressed him.

Pennsylvania Superior Court Decision Required Claims to be filed “Derivatively” As Opposed to Individually on Behalf of a Shareholder

On February 5, 2014, a Superior Court of Pennsylvania issued an interesting and important decision explaining when claims must be brought derivatively as opposed to individually in the name of a shareholder. Hill v. Ofalt, 85 A.3d 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014).

A “derivative” claim is a lawsuit brought by a shareholder on behalf of the corporation against a third-party. The central issue in Hill v. Ofalt, was whether or not Thomas Hill (“Hill”) a 50% shareholder of a closely held Pennsylvania corporation called Millstone Restaurant Company, Inc. (“Millstone”) could assert direct claims alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and conversion and seeking declaratory relief all against the other 50% shareholder, Defendant Ronald Ofalt (“Ofalt”). After considering the nature of those claims, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that Hill could not assert those claims directly. In other words, the Pennsylvania Appellate Court agreed with the Trial Court that those claims belonged to the corporation and therefore had to be asserted derivatively. Nevertheless, the Hill Court reversed the Trial Court’s denial of Hill’s motion to amend the complaint, so as to assert derivative claims.

The decision is important and interesting because it provides a good explanation as to when claims must be brought derivatively as opposed to individually in Pennsylvania. In summary, the analysis hinges on who suffered the complained damages as alleged in the complaint. In this case, the Plaintiff alleged that Ofalt was stealing from the corporation. Moreover, Hill alleged that Ofalt stole trustee taxes from the company. Furthermore, Hill alleged as a result of Ofalt’s unlawful activities the corporation eventually went out of business exposing Hill to personal financial peril because he personally guaranteed the corporation’s mortgage.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania analyzed each of the claims raised in the complaint. The Hill Court held, “under established Pennsylvania law, a shareholder does not have standing to institute a direct suit for "a harm [that is] peculiar to the corporation and that is only indirectly injurious to the shareholder." Hill v. Ofalt, 85 A.3d at 548 (quoting, Reifsnyder v. Pgh. Outdoor Adver. Co., 405 Pa. 142, 173 A.2d 319, 321 (Pa. 1961)).” Rather, such a claim belongs to, and is an asset of, the corporation. Id. “To have standing to sue individually, the shareholder must allege a direct, personal injury – that is independent of any injury to the corporation – and the shareholder must be entitled to receive the benefit of any recovery.” Hill v. Ofalt, 85 A.3d at 549. Because the Court concluded the primary injuries suffered as a result of the alleged unlawful activities were borne by the corporation the Court held the claims must be brought derivatively.

The decision in dicta (a part of the opinion which went beyond the facts of the case) discussed whether or not a Pennsylvania shareholder could individually assert minority oppression claims under Pennsylvania law. Id. at 550. The Court relied upon previously decided cases and said that an oppressed minority shareholder could assert direct claims against the majority shareholder. Id. (considering, Feber v. Am. Lamp. Corp., 469 A.2d 1046, 1050 (Pa. 1983); Viener v. Jacobs, 834 A.2d 546, 556 (Pa. Super. 2003). Because Hill did not assert oppression claim against Ofalt, the Court did not reverse.

One of the unique things about litigating in Pennsylvania is “preliminary objections.” Pennsylvania requires litigants to plead with specificity (as opposed to most states which are merely notice pleading states). If the case is not plead with specificity it is subject to dismissal by way of preliminary objections. Hence, when asserting minority oppression claims in a Pennsylvania action it is extremely important to set forth specific ways the minority shareholder was injured (as opposed to the corporation).

Finally, when drafting or responding to a complaint filed in Pennsylvania state court, it is imperative that the claim be properly asserted derivatively or individually. The Hill decision provides guidance on this issue. 

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